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Psychological research into spontaneous or intrusive cognitions has typically focused on
cognitions in one predefined domain, such as obsessional thoughts in OCD, intrusive
memories in posttraumatic stress disorder and depression, or involuntary autobiographi-
cal memories and daydreaming in everyday life. Such studies have resulted in a wealth of
knowledge about these specific cognitions. However, by focusing on a predefined type of
cognition, other subtypes of cognition that may co-occur can be missed. In this exploratory
study, we aimed to assess involuntary cognitions in everyday life without a pre-determined
focus on any specific subtype of cognition. Seventy unselected undergraduate student par-
ticipants were administered a questionnaire that assessed the presence of any involuntary
cognitions in the past month, their quality, type, content, and potential function. In addi-
tion, participants provided self-descriptions and completed measures of psychopathology.
Content analyses showed that involuntary cognitions were common, predominantly visual
in nature, emotional, often about social relationships, and often related to a hypotheti-
cal function of emotional processing. About two-thirds of the cognitions that participants
reported were memories. Non-memories included daydreams, imaginary worst case sce-
narios, imaginary future events, hypothetical reconstructions, and ruminations. Memories
and non-memories were strikingly similar in their subjective experience of content and
emotionality. Negative (but not positive) self-descriptions were associated with negative
involuntary cognitions and psychopathology, suggesting a link between involuntary cog-
nitions and the self. Overall, the findings suggest that people experience a wide variety
of subtypes of involuntary cognitions in everyday life. Moreover, the specific subtype of
involuntary cognition appears to be less important than its valence or content, at least to
the subjective experience of the individual.
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INTRODUCTION
The field of psychology is characterized by a historical interest in
the ways of the mind that appear to operate beyond voluntary
control. For example, Sigmund Freud inspired an interest in sub-
conscious processes that operate outside of our volition. Within
the domain of psychopathology there has been a marked inter-
est in involuntary phenomena such as psychotic hallucinations,
obsessions, and traumatic flashbacks. In cognitive psychology, a
growing body of research has investigated the occurrence of invol-
untary memories experienced in everyday life by individuals in the
general population. These interests in involuntary processes across
the clinical and cognitive psychology literatures have resulted in
numerous scientific publications on specific forms of involuntary
cognitions; i.e., thoughts, memories, or images that come into
awareness in the absence of an intention of conjuring them. In
this study, we aimed to explore involuntary cognitions in everyday
life using a bottom-up approach that is free from the restrictions
of any theoretical framework or an a priori restrictive focus on any
one subtype of involuntary cognition.
Several theorists and researchers have sought to describe and
explore features of different forms of involuntary cognitions. Some
studies sought to compare involuntary cognitions between clinical
and non-clinical populations, whereas others assessed their occur-
rence in everyday life. Below we describe the main observations
that have emerged from this literature. Throughout this litera-
ture, many different terms have been used to describe the type
of cognition that was studied (e.g., obsessions, intrusive thoughts,
and involuntary memories), although a definition of the adopted
terms is not always provided. When reviewing the literature, we
will describe the research findings using the original terminol-
ogy adopted by the authors, and provide their definitions where
available. In our own writing, we use the term “cognition” as an
umbrella term for memories, thoughts, and images. “Memories”
refer to representations in autobiographical or semantic mem-
ory, “thoughts” refer to verbal thoughts, and “images” refer to
mental images from sensory modalities, most commonly visual.
Thoughts and images may or may not be part of a memory
representation.
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INVOLUNTARY AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
Involuntary negative autobiographical memories (often referred
to in the literature as “intrusive memories” owing to the fact that
they are distressing and intrude into consciousness unbidden)
represent another type of involuntary cognition that has been
investigated across a range of clinical disorders (1). Involuntary
memories of negative events have been characterized and studied
most extensively in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a clini-
cal condition in which the reliving of one’s traumatic experience
via the experience of recurrent and distressing memories is a key
diagnostic criterion. Beyond PTSD, a growing evidence-base has
documented the presence of involuntary negative memories, as
well as other mental images, in a range of disorders, including panic
disorder with agoraphobia (2), social phobia (3), bipolar disorder
(4), grief (5), and depression (6). However, although involuntary
memories of negative events are reported by clinical samples, it
is noteworthy that such memories are also reported by healthy
individuals. For example, Newby and Moulds (6) found that there
was no significant difference between the proportions of currently
depressed, formerly depressed, and never-depressed individuals
who had experienced an involuntary memory of a negative event
in the previous week. Interestingly, the phenomenological expe-
rience of involuntary negative autobiographical memories (e.g.,
here and now quality, reliving) was strikingly similar across the
three groups; however, currently depressed participants reported
that their memories were more vivid, distressing, caused greater
interference, and were associated with more sadness, helplessness,
and anger.
Turning to studies on this topic outside of the clinical liter-
ature, Brewin et al. (7) assessed intrusive thoughts and intru-
sive autobiographical memories in a non-clinical sample. They
defined intrusive thoughts as “spontaneous, repetitive thoughts”
that interrupted ongoing activities and were hard to control,
including images, impulses, or ideas. Intrusive memories were
defined as memories of a specific event that interrupted daily
activities and were hard to control. Participants were asked to
report five intrusive memories and five intrusive thoughts and
to rate their frequency in the past 2 weeks, as well as their level
of (un)pleasantness. After controlling for the order of recall (i.e.,
memories first or thoughts first), the only difference that emerged
was that thoughts tended to intrude more often than memories.
Studies conducted outside of the laboratory have also inves-
tigated involuntary autobiographical memories in everyday life.
For example, in an elaborate diary study, Berntsen (8) asked 14
participants to record 50 involuntary memories with a maximum
of 2 memories per day. Participants answered a series of ques-
tions about each memory. In addition to the diary, participants
were asked to estimate how many involuntary memories they
experienced on an average day. Participants reported that they
experienced more than two involuntary memories per day, with
five or six involuntary memories per day being the most typical
estimate (range 3–20). Almost all memories were cued by trig-
gers that shared salient features with the memory, with activities,
objects, and people being the most common triggers. The valence
of the memories was often congruent with participants’mood state
at the time of recall [see also Ref. (9)]. Most of the memories were
of unusual events, such as traveling abroad, parties, and romantic
encounters, and memories were more often rated as positive rather
than negative [see also Ref. (10)]. Participants reported an increase
in positive mood as a result of recalling positive memories, and an
increase in negative mood from recalling negative memories.
In another study, using Galton’s “memory walk” as well as a
word-cue task, Berntsen and Hall (11) found that involuntary
autobiographical memories, compared to voluntary memories,
were more often of specific events as opposed to general events, and
evoked more intense physical and emotional reactions. Using diary
monitoring, Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (12) found that partici-
pants experienced an average of 17 involuntary autobiographical
memories over a period of 1 week.
INVOLUNTARY SEMANTIC “MEMORIES”
In other studies, researchers have examined instances in which
semantic information comes to mind spontaneously. Kvavilashvili
and Mandler (13) referred to these instances as “involuntary
semantic memories,” and defined them as information without
context and not related to the self, such as words, images, or
songs. In a study with 205 psychology students, Kvavilashvili and
Mandler (13; Study 3) administered a questionnaire that asked
participants whether they had experienced involuntary semantic
memories or “mind-popping.” Of the participants, 84% indicated
that they had at any time in their life experienced involuntary
semantic memories. On average, participants estimated that these
memories occurred between 1–2 and 3–4 times per week. The
most frequent type of memory was a familiar tune popping into
mind (indicated by 80% of participants).
In a subsequent study (13; Study 4), the authors compared
involuntary semantic memories to involuntary autobiographi-
cal memories obtained from 50 psychology students. Participants
were asked to record their involuntary autobiographical memories
in a diary for 1 week, and their involuntary semantic“memories”in
a diary during another week (in counterbalanced order). Overall,
205 involuntary autobiographical memories and 74 involuntary
semantic memories were reported, which was a statistically signif-
icant difference in frequency. Similar to the earlier study, involun-
tary semantic memories were of words (61%), songs (27%), and
images (12%). The authors did not report on the content of the
autobiographical memories. Both memory types were associated
with relatively low levels of cognitive demand or concentration.
Eighty percent of the involuntary autobiographical memories were
associated with identifiable triggers, whereas this was only the
case for 37% of the involuntary semantic memories, which was
a statistically significant difference.
INVOLUNTARY THOUGHTS AND IMAGES
In an early paper on this topic,Rachman and De Silva (14) reported
the findings of two studies in which they assessed obsessions in a
non-clinical and a clinical sample of “obsessional patients”; i.e.,
individuals who sought clinical help for their obsessions. Obses-
sions were defined as “repetitive, unwanted, intrusive thoughts of
internal origin” (p. 233). In the first study, 99 out of 124 non-
clinical participants reported experiencing obsessional thoughts,
which they generally found easy to dismiss. Participants varied in
the extent to which they rated their obsessions as tolerable. In the
second study, information about obsessions was obtained from
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clinical and non-clinical participants. Blind raters with clinical
experience were presented with the obsessions and asked to judge
whether each one was reported by a clinical or non-clinical partic-
ipant. The raters were fairly accurate in identifying the obsessions
from the non-clinical participants as belonging to the non-clinical
group. However, for the obsessions reported by clinical partici-
pants, raters did not do well in identifying these obsessions as
belonging to the clinical group. This indicated that the content
was quite similar in both groups. The obsessions reported by par-
ticipants in the clinical group were experienced as longer, more
frequent, more intense, and less acceptable and dismissible than
the obsessions reported by participants in the non-clinical group.
A later study by Salkovskis and Harrison (15) replicated these
results and further reported that participants’ discomfort with
experiencing the obsessions was not related to obsession type (i.e.,
“thoughts” or “impulses”), but by the ease with which they could
be dismissed.
Clark and De Silva (16) asked non-clinical participants to rate
a list of six depressive and six anxious cognitions (i.e., thoughts
and images) on several dimensions. On average, participants
reported that these cognitions occurred between twice a month
and once a week. Anxious cognitions were rated as more emo-
tionally intense than depressive cognitions, and the perceived
controllability of both anxious and depressive cognitions predicted
their frequency. In turn, frequency and emotional intensity (and
disapproval for anxious cognitions only) predicted participants’
ratings of controllability.
Beyond studies of involuntary memories and involuntary
thoughts, researchers have investigated other intrusive cognitive
phenomena and processes, including mind wandering (17, 18)
and involuntary images of future events [“flashforwards”; (19)].
PRESENT STUDY: INVOLUNTARY COGNITIONS
Taken together, the studies outlined above provide valuable
insights into an array of specific subtypes of involuntary cogni-
tions that have been indexed across studies in the clinical and
non-clinical literatures. Although investigating different types of
involuntary cognition, a common feature of these studies is that
the researchers identified a priori the subtype of involuntary cogni-
tion that was to be assessed. This may be an important limitation of
the literature, because it may well be that people experience a range
of different types of involuntary cognition. Focusing on one or two
pre-determined subtypes of involuntary cognitions precludes the
collection of data on other subtypes, and limits examinations of
their relative importance in everyday life. That is, when wanting to
determine the content of a fruit basket, one can decide to exam-
ine only cherries, or apples, or bananas. However, by doing so,
the full content of the basket will never be known. In light of the
abovementioned limitations, in this study we adopted a bottom-
up approach as a means by which to take a first step into exploring
the full scope of involuntary cognitions in everyday life as they are
experienced by an unselected sample of individuals.
Given that involuntary cognitions are accepted as a transdiag-
nostic occurrence across many disorders [e.g., Ref. (20)] we also
explored the link between different types of involuntary cognitions
that would emerge from our procedure and psychopathology.
The link between involuntary cognitions and psychopathology
has been described in the Self-Memory System Model [SMS;
(21)]. According to this model, the content of involuntary images
should be related to psychopathology through the individual’s self-
images. In order to explore this link, self-descriptions were also
obtained.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventy participants (58 females) were recruited from the stu-
dent population of the Radboud University Nijmegen. Of these,
68 were undergraduate students, one was a graduate student, and
one recently dropped out of their course. Participants received a
C10 gift voucher for their participation, and ranged in age from
18 to 37 (M = 21.71, SD= 3.65).
INVOLUNTARY COGNITIONS QUESTIONNAIRE
This self-report questionnaire was developed for the purpose of
this study and the structure was based on earlier intrusive memory
interviews (22–24). First, participants read an introduction about
involuntary cognitions, which read:
Many people have the experience that in some moments a
certain image, a certain thought, or a certain memory comes
to mind, without them deliberately thinking about this. These
can be positive as well as negative experiences. Someone who
is in love, for example, sees the face of his or her loved one in
their mind time and time again. Someone who just experi-
enced a car accident can keep seeing images of this experience
in their mind. It is also possible that someone frequently sees
a certain image in mind without exactly knowing where this
is coming from. For example, someone can see an image of
themselves completely alone, or trapped, or covered in germs.
What is important here is that it is about images, thoughts,
or memories that come in your mind spontaneously without
you deliberately thinking about it.
Participants were then asked whether they had experienced any
such spontaneous images, thoughts, or memories within the
last month. If they had, participants were then asked to pro-
vide a detailed description of each image/thought/memory, which
included its content (e.g., location, people, event, and time), per-
sonal meaning, whether it was a memory of an actual event that
they had experienced (yes/no), which (if any) emotions were asso-
ciated with the involuntary cognition (fear, anger, sadness, disgust,
happiness, or other), and how strongly they experienced any such
emotions (1= not at all, 7= very strongly). After completing these
questions, participants were asked whether they had experienced
another spontaneous image, thought, or memory within the past
month. If so, the questions were repeated for this involuntary
cognition. Participants were queried about a maximum of three
involuntary cognitions.
CODING SCHEME
The descriptions of the involuntary cognitions on the involun-
tary cognitions questionnaire (ICQ) were coded independently
by two raters (Julie Krans and June de Bree) on the characteris-
tics of quality, type, content, and exploratory, possible function.
Disagreements were resolved based on consensus after discussion.
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Quality
For quality, involuntary cognitions were classified according to
their dominant quality (i.e., visual, verbal, emotional, or bodily
sensation). These categories were based on earlier studies on the
qualities of intrusive memories (22–24). Inter-rater agreement for
quality was K = 0.472.
Type
For type, participants’ response to the question about whether
the involuntary cognition was a memory was used to identify
spontaneous cognitions as either memories or non-memories. We
initially intended to code non-memory cognitions according to
existing categories (25), but this resulted in a high number of
unclassifiable cognitions. Accordingly, we classified non-memory
involuntary cognitions into the following categories, on the basis
of the coders’ ratings (i.e., Julie Krans and June de Bree; K = 0.666):
daydream, worst case scenario, future event, hypothetical recon-
struction (descriptions that fill gaps in the information that the
participant has about a certain event), or rumination (recurring
and extended verbal dwellings on a certain topic).
Content
The content of the involuntary cognitions were coded into cat-
egories based on the classification systems developed to study
self-defining memories (25, 26), on the basis that these categories
were a good fit for the involuntary cognitions reported by partici-
pants (K = 0.714). These categories were as follows: relationships
(emphasis is on a particular interpersonal relationship), life-
threatening events (plausible or actual death or threatened physical
well-being of oneself or someone else), recreation/exploration
(recreation, play or exploration or obstruction of these), achieve-
ment/mastery (the effortful striving toward or achievement of
own, in-group, or significant others’ physical, material, social, or
spiritual goals), guilt/shame (issues of wrong or right, moral, and
ethical decisions), and not classifiable (not belonging to any of
these categories).
Function
The function categories were the most explorative of all cate-
gories. Although the literature of function of autobiographical
memory is rather substantive [e.g., Ref. (27)], to our knowledge,
no empirical research has been published on functions of invol-
untary recall. According to a functional analysis of involuntary
memories (28), the theoretical literature has suggested several
possible “functions.” Therefore, we borrowed from the autobio-
graphical memory literature and the trauma literature to develop
our “function” categories.
Emotional processing. First, according to the Self-Memory Sys-
tem of autobiographical memory (21), involuntary memories
persist when there is a discrepancy between an individual’s current
state and desired state. The content of the involuntary memory
provides information about the nature of this discrepancy. In that
sense, involuntary memories “signal” that something is wrong and
action needs to be taken to reduce a certain unwanted discrep-
ancy in the psychological self. The dual representation theory of
PTSD (29) suggests that in trauma, involuntary memories pro-
vide the information that is necessary to emotionally process the
traumatic event. That is, a traumatic event often induces a discrep-
ancy in the self (not dissimilar to the discrepancy put forward by
the Self-Memory System), which can be dealt with by integrating
all available information about the event with other knowledge
in autobiographical memory. The theory proposes that highly
emotional sensory information is by definition stored in invol-
untary memories, hence these memories provide the necessary
information to successfully emotionally process the event. Taken
together, these two models appear to converge on the idea that
involuntary memories contain information that aids in the emo-
tional processing of an emotional experience. Here, this category
included involuntary cognitions that emphasized an event that
still required closure, such as loss or holding a continuing grudge
against someone about a wrong-doing in the past.
Maintaining social relations. In the autobiographical memory
literature it has been suggested that recalling (and sharing) auto-
biographical memories about significant others is involved in the
maintenance of social relationships (30). It is possible that invol-
untary memories or other cognitions about significant others may
be helpful for the same reason. That is, recurring involuntary
cognitions about friends, family, or other social relations may stim-
ulate the social relation by keeping the memory active. Therefore,
involuntary cognitions that emphasized a specific relationship
with a significant other were assigned to this category.
Mood repair. In the emotional memory and depression litera-
ture, it has been found that individuals can improve a sad mood
state by recalling positive autobiographical memories [e.g., Ref.
(31–33)]. Positive images especially are expected to have an effect
on mood (34). Hence, it is possible that spontaneous occurrences
of positive images can have the same effect. Accordingly, involun-
tary cognitions that emphasized positive events or feelings were
assigned to this category.
Preparation. Thinking about or imagining future events has been
implicated in the preparation for and likelihood of actual behav-
ior in the future (34, 35). Similarly, involuntary cognitions about
upcoming events may provide an opportunity for preparation and
increase likelihood of future actions. Involuntary cognitions that
predominantly emphasized upcoming events were assigned to this
category.
Warning signal. This may be the most concrete proposed func-
tion of involuntary memories, at least in the trauma literature.
According to the warning signal hypothesis [e.g., Ref. (22)], invol-
untary memories of negative events come to mind in situations
that resemble the physical characteristics of this earlier negative
experience. In this way, the involuntary cognition functions as
a “warning signal” for potential danger in the present situation.
Involuntary cognitions of negative events that were triggered by
(a subjective sense of) similarity with the current situation were
assigned to this category. We note one difference between Ehlers
et al. (22) warning signal hypothesis and our conceptualization
of this function in the current study: the involuntary cognitions
reported by participants in this study were not restricted to actual
memories of a traumatic event.
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SELF-DESCRIPTIONS
Self-descriptions were assessed with the Twenty-Statements Test
[TST; (36, 37)]. The TST assesses individual self-descriptions as
conceptualized in the SMS model by asking participants to com-
plete 20 sentences starting with “I am. . .” (37). These descriptions
were subsequently coded as positive (e.g., “I am smart”), nega-
tive (“I am ugly”), and neutral (“I am curious”) self-descriptions
(K = 0.785).
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
The Dutch version of the Symptom Checklist 90 [SCL-90; (38)] is
a 90-item self-report questionnaire that assesses perceived current
physical and mental complaints aimed to reflect a general level
of psychopathology. It is one of the most widely used screen-
ing questionnaires in Dutch mental health facilities. The total
score is an indicator of general physical/mental dysfunction or
“psychoneuroticism.” In addition, the following subscales can be
identified: Somatization, Obsessive compulsive, Interpersonal sen-
sitivity, Depression, Anxiety, Hostility, Phobic anxiety, Paranoid
ideation, Psychoticism, and additional items. In a Dutch sample
of individuals who contacted a mental health facility for the first
time the internal consistency was α= 0.97 (39).
PROCEDURE
Participants were tested individually in a testing cubicle in
the lab of the Behavioral Science Institute. They completed
a demographics questionnaire, the ICQ, followed by several
measures that are not relevant to the present study (assess-
ing depression, anxiety, goals, and self-esteem) and the SCL-
90. For more information on all measures that were included
in the study please contact the corresponding author. After-
wards participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid. The entire
session was usually completed within about 45 min. All ques-
tionnaires and tasks were completed on a PC using Inquisit
version 2.0 (40).
RESULTS
FREQUENCY
In total 62 involuntary cognitions were reported. Of the 70 par-
ticipants, 23 (32.86%) reported not having experienced any invol-
untary cognitions in the past month. A further 34 participants
(48.57%) reported 1 involuntary cognition, whereas 11 (15.71%)
and 2 (2.86%) participants reported 2 and 3 involuntary cogni-
tions, respectively. Thus, the majority of all participants, which is
67.14% of the present sample, recalled having experienced at least
one involuntary cognition in the past month.
ASSOCIATED EMOTIONS AND EMOTIONAL INTENSITY
For two participants no emotion data were recorded due to a
technical error. On the ICQ participants were presented with the
options “fear,”“anger,”“sadness,”“disgust,”“happiness,” or “other.”
For 13 involuntary cognitions, the “other” category was endorsed
after which participants were asked to label the associated emotion.
The “other” category emotions were labeled by the participants as
“distress,”“love,”“doubt,”“shame,” and “relaxed.” The large major-
ity of involuntary cognitions were associated with either happiness
(20; 32.26%) or sadness (15; 24.19%). These two categories far out-
weighed all other categories. Table 1 presents the frequency with
Table 1 | Frequencies of endorsed emotions for all involuntary
cognitions in descending order and the mean emotional intensity per
emotion.
Emotion Frequency Intensity
M SD
Happiness 20 6.05 0.74
Sadness 15 5.67 0.90
Fear 6 4.83 0.98
Distress 6 5.00 0.84
Anger 3 5.33 0.58
Disgust 3 6.33 0.58
Love 3 6.00 0.00
Doubt 2 5.50 0.71
Shame 1 6.00 n.a.
Relaxation 1 6.00 n.a.
which each emotion was endorsed and the mean intensity score
for each emotion.
Overall, the reported involuntary cognitions were highly emo-
tional, with average intensity ratings across emotions from 4.83
to 6.33 on a 1–7 scale. Due to low numbers of involuntary cog-
nitions that were associated with emotions other than happy or
sad, no statistical analyses were performed to test for differences
in emotional intensity.
QUALITY
The large majority of involuntary cognitions (82.26%, n= 51)
were predominantly visual in nature. A further 8.06% (n= 5) were
predominantly verbal in nature, four (6.45%) were predominantly
an emotional experience,one was a bodily sensation,and one could
not be coded into any of these categories.
TYPE
For more than half of the involuntary cognitions (61.29%, n= 38),
participants indicated that the content was a memory of a specific
event that had occurred in their lives. Thus, the remaining 24 invol-
untary cognitions were not memories. These non-memories were
classified into the Type categories. Table 2 presents the frequency
for each category, as well as an example.
CONTENT
Half of all involuntary cognitions were about relationships. The
next most frequent content concerned life-threatening events
(n= 15; 24.19%), followed by recreation/exploration (n= 8;
12.90%), achievement/mastery (n= 4; 6.45%), and guilt/shame
involuntary cognitions (n= 2; 3.23%). Two involuntary cogni-
tions were marked as not classifiable, as they did not fit into any
of these categories. Table 3 presents an example of an involuntary
cognition for each of the categories.
FUNCTION
Of all involuntary cognitions, 22 (35.48%) were assigned to
the category emotional processing, 15 (24.19%) to maintain-
ing social relations, 12 (19.35%) to warning signals, 8 to mood
repair (12.90%), and 5 (8.06%) to preparation. Table 4 provides
examples for each category.
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Table 2 |The type of non-memory involuntary cognitions with their frequency and an example for each.
Type Frequency
Daydream 7
Example:
I sometimes see a person with whom I might be in love, we are in a room and he looks at me and I have the feeling that he honestly thinks that he loves
me. Besides us no one else is in the room. I have several feelings with it, on the one hand it’s very beautiful to me, and on the other hand it’s not, because
in theory I shouldn’t have feelings for him. Still I think it’s beautiful, when the image appears
Worst case scenario 5
Example:
Last Friday I was at my parents’ house and there was no one else at home, only our 2 dogs were there. I was brushing/grooming one of them and the TV
was on at the same time, where a movie was playing. Suddenly the image came to mind that my brother would not make it through the job application,
that his world collapsed, including my parents’ and therefore of the entire family. There was a lot of pressure, because in times of this economic crisis as
a [occupation] he would not get a new chance soon. After I had let the image come over me, a worried and jaded feeling came over me, also because it
could come true. There was indeed a chance that he would not make it. Of course you take this into account, but still
Future event 5
Example:
The location is [city name] and I’m there with my future friends. It’s about the art academy where I’m going in [month] it is an image instead of a memory.
This means a lot to me because I really want it. I have positive thought with it. I’m happy but also a little insecure of whether I will be able to do it
Hypothetical reconstruction 4
Example:
On the occasion of break-in at home. Backyard, 2 burglars, walking through the backyard to the backdoor, seeing exactly how they would have done it. It
happens at night. Does not really mean anything to me, I try to ignore it. It evokes feelings of fear, doubt whether they will come back again and if it really
happened this way. Desire to see the movie in real life so that I really know how it happened
Rumination 3
Example:
When I’m alone then often memories come up of my relation that ended 2 weeks ago. I mostly have this when I’m alone, then I start wallowing in my
head and then memories come up. Or when I hear a specific music track that is associated with a memory or that I encounter things that remind me of
the 4.5 year relationship. So my ex is involved in this. And it takes place mostly at night when I’m alone in my room and don’t have distraction from other
people. It evokes mixed feelings, feelings of loss but also negative feelings about everything that went wrong and how much it has hurt me. I often am
furious but I can also burst into tears because it has become such a mess. And I often have to tell myself: Come on, you deserve better. But that is often
easier said than done
SELF-DESCRIPTIONS
The number of positive self-descriptions was significantly cor-
related with psychopathology, r =−0.31, p= 0.009, but was not
associated with any of the other measures. The number of negative
self-descriptions was significantly correlated with psychopathol-
ogy, r = 0.43, p < 0.001, the number of negative involuntary cog-
nitions, r = 0.32, p= 0.008, the number of sad involuntary cogni-
tions, r = 0.36, p= 0.002, the level of sadness of these involuntary
cognitions, r = 0.38, p= 0.001, the number of involuntary cogni-
tions with guilt/shame content, r = 0.29, p= 0.016, and the num-
ber of involuntary cognitions that were assigned to the emotional
processing function category, r = 0.38, p= 0.001.
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
SCL-90 scores were significantly correlated with the level of dis-
tress associated with cognitions that participants reported as
distressing, r = 0.25, p= 0.037, number of cognitions that were
associated with disgust, r = 0.29, p= 0.016, and the levels of
disgust associated with those cognitions, r = 0.29, p= 0.015, num-
ber of cognitions in the form of bodily sensations, r = 0.322,
p= 0.007, and the number of worst case scenario non-memory
involuntary cognitions, r = 0.25, p= 0.037, and, as mentioned,
the number of positive, r =−0.31, p= 0.009, and negative self-
descriptions, r = 0.43, p < 0.001. Table 5 shows the Pearson corre-
lations between each of the SCL-90 subscales (columns),and invol-
untary cognitions characteristics and self-descriptions (rows).
Only variables with at least one significant correlation with the
SCL-90 subscales are included.
COMPARISONS BETWEEN INVOLUNTARY MEMORIES VS.
INVOLUNTARY NON-MEMORIES
The finding that nearly half of the reported involuntary cogni-
tions were not memories was of great interest to us, particularly in
light of the surprising lack of empirical research into non-memory
involuntary cognitions. The relative proportions of memories and
non-memories therefore prompted us to consider the extent to
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Table 3 | Examples of each of the Content categories.
Content category Example
Relationships (n=31) There is not really a location. It is about my father whom I haven’t seen for about 14 years due to circumstances.
I visualize him and me in a living room where we catch up on the last 14 years. The time when it plays is also unclear.
The image means quite a lot to me. I would like to speak to him again and stuff, but it doesn’t work the way I want it to.
The thoughts I have with this are tricky, because I don’t know what he is like now and how I will respond to that in turn.
It evokes (again) feelings of being incomplete
Life-threatening event (n=15) A car came by very closely and I already saw myself lying under the car. I was alone. I felt very nervous afterwards
Recreation/exploration (n=8) A holiday in America with a friend who was an au pair there for a year. We are cycling in the sun, on our way to the
supermarket for groceries. This is sometime during the course of a weekday, on which my friend had to work as usual.
This image makes me happy, I think back to this holiday as very successful, a beautiful experience. It was also a unique
experience. In relation to the weather in the Netherlands I think back to it and then I feel a little nostalgic. Especially the
weather is important in this memory. Also the feeling of being happy, not to have to do things, just holiday and relaxation
Achievement/mastery (n=4) I think a lot about a job interview that I have in the near future. It is set in a room at the [name university]. The feelings it
evokes I can perhaps best describe as ‘healthy stress’. I think about it a lot because I really want to be admitted, but
that also causes mild tensions
Guilt/shame (n=2) Last week when I was lying in bed a shameful event came up spontaneously that was not nice at all at that moment.
The same shameful feeling arose and I wanted mostly to cringe
Table 4 | Examples for each of the function categories.
Category Example
Emotional processing (n=22) Location: the apartment where I used to live with my boyfriend at the time. What happens: my sister and my
boyfriend are making love. When does it happen: when I was out working. It is something that I hadn’t wanted
to know. That it happened is already bad enough, but I hadn’t wanted to know. Sometimes I don’t care at all,
sometimes I feel so betrayed, then I see myself again at Easter giving my boyfriend and sister an Easter egg
and hearing myself say: “For the two people I love the most.” That my boyfriend cheated on me is not even the
problem, but that my sister could so easily betray me I really cannot understand
Maintaining social relations (n=15) A good friend – that I like very much by the way – who has been a regular fellow passenger on the train. She
often sat across from me and sometimes I see her in my mind, even though in reality no one is sitting across
from me. A visualized memory of those travels, which do me good
Warning signal (n=12) Memory: I once had my toe stuck between something which made the nail almost fall off. The doctor then
removed the nail and it looked horrible for a while. Every time I’m wearing thongs on the bicycle/walk behind a
grocery cart I’m afraid that my toe will get stuck between. There is no special location/people present/event.
Just the startle moment and the image of the bloody toe. It always frightens me and I’m scared it will happen
again, it’s not that I’m afraid of the pain, but the way it looked just gives me the creeps. Then I don’t feel
comfortable at all for a moment
Non-memory: Someone is holding something valuable in their hand and I see in my mind how the objects falls
down on the floor. Sometimes it’s just a bottle of wine held by my friend and I feel like I need to be vigilant and
be ready to catch the bottle
Mood repair (n=8) In [city] at the quay during the [event]. Together with a colleague a meeting with a group of guys. It happened
last year. We chat some and then party on for a long time all together. Evokes feelings of joy because it was a
lot of fun and hoping to run into them again this year.
Preparation (n=5) It’s more thoughts than experiences. Because I study in [country] but am from [other country], I think about my
parents a lot lately and thoughts of them come to mind. Partly I wonder what they are doing now and partly I
think about what it would be like if they wouldn’t be there anymore, because they are near their 70s already.
Then I do wonder whether I will be able to say that I have spent enough time with them. This is not necessarily
negative for me. I’m thinking about them a lot and actively take on things, which makes me feel that we ARE
spending an intensive amount of time together because I realize that the time together can end
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Table 5 | Pearson correlations between the SCL-90 subscales, and characteristics of the involuntary cognitions and self-descriptions.
SOM OBS INT DEP ANX HOS PHO PAR PSY ADD
Emotion
Distress n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.275* 0.240* n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Disgust n.s. 0.294* 0.308* n.s. n.s. 0.426*** 0.330** n.s. n.s. 0.256*
Love n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.289* n.s.
Intensity
Happiness n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. −0.258* n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Distress 0.242* n.s. n.s. 0.259* 0.316** 0.244* n.s. 0.249* n.s. n.s.
Disgust n.s. 0.301* 0.310* n.s. n.s. 0.409** 0.320** n.s. 0.251* 0.255*
Love n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.289* n.s.
Quality
Bodily sensation 0.349** 0.307* 0.282* n.s. 0.385* 0.275* 0.532*** n.s. n.s. 0.241*
Type
Worst case scenario 0.290* n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.370** 0.340** n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Rumination n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.316** 0.341**
Content
Life-threatening event n.s. 0.246** n.s. n.s. 0.316** n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Function
Warning signal n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.318** n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Self-descriptions
Positive n.s. −0.362** −0.358** −0.236* n.s. −0.275* −0.248* n.s. n.s. n.s.
Negative n.s. 0.427*** 0.380** 0.436*** n.s. 0.350** 0.291* 0.357** 0.295* 0.269*
SOM, somatization; OBS, obsessive compulsive; INT, interpersonal sensitivity; DEP, depression; ANX, anxiety; HOS, hostility; PHO, phobic anxiety; PAR, paranoid
ideation; PSY, psychoticism; ADD, additional items. *p< 0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
which these two types of involuntary cognitions might overlap or
differ in terms of their features, as well as the way in which they
are subjectively experienced.
Chi-square analyses were conducted to compare memories and
non-memories on valence (positive and negative), associated emo-
tions, quality, content, and function. A t -test was conducted to
compare the levels of emotion (i.e., emotional intensity) of the
emotions associated with the involuntary cognitions. Memories vs.
non-memories were equally often positive or negative, and there
was no difference in the associated emotions or the emotionality
(i.e., rated level of emotion) of the two types of cognitions, all
ps >0.05.
There was a significant difference in the content of the
involuntary cognitions between memories and non-memories,
χ2(5)= 15.71, p= 0.008, and a difference in the function,
χ2(4)= 10.51,p= 0.033. The difference in quality approached sig-
nificance, χ2(4)= 9.19, p= 0.057. In regards to content, approx-
imately half of all memory and non-memory involuntary cog-
nitions were about relationships. After that, memories were
most often about life-threatening events whereas non-memories
were equally often about life-threatening events and achieve-
ment/mastery. That is, life-threatening events were twice as likely
to be the content of memories as non-memories. Finally, none
of the non-memories were about recreation/exploration, whereas
about 21% of memories have this content.
In terms of possible function, memory involuntary cognitions
were most often coded as having the possible function of emo-
tional processing and social relations. Further, this function was
assigned to memory involuntary cognitions twice as often as was
the function of mood recovery or warning signals. Similarly, the
function of emotional processing was most often assigned to
non-memory involuntary cognitions. In contrast to memories,
non-memories had the possible function of social relations, prepa-
ration, and warning signals equally often. Relatively speaking, the
functions of emotional processing followed by social relations were
assigned to memories and non-memories equally often. Memories
tended to be associated with the possible function of mood repair
relatively more often than non-memories. Non-memories tended
to be associated with the possible functions of preparation and
warning signal relatively more often than memories. In fact, none
of the memories were coded as having the function of preparation.
The large majority of memories were predominantly visual
in nature, whereas only about two-thirds of the non-memories
were. This is perhaps not surprising because autobiographical
memories by definition have a strong visual component whereas
non-memories could also exist of purely verbal thoughts (e.g.,
ruminations).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to explore the occurrence of involuntary
cognitions in everyday life using a bottom-up approach. We use
the term “involuntary cognitions” to refer to memories, thoughts,
and mental images that pop up into mind spontaneously, without
conscious effort to retrieve or produce them. To assess involun-
tary cognitions in everyday life, a PC administered structured
interview was presented to an unselected group of 70 university
students, most of them female. The interview queried participants
about involuntary memories, thoughts, and images from the past
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month. By adopting a bottom-up approach, the exploratory analy-
sis was more or less free of guidance from any specific theoretical
framework, and was not limited to one specific type of cognition.
In this sample, 67.14% of participants reported at least one
involuntary cognition in the past month. In terms of qualities or
characteristics, all cognitions were considered to have at least some
emotional impact, and the predominant emotions were “happy”
and “sad.” In regard to sensory modality, 82.26% of the reported
involuntary cognitions were rated as being predominantly visual in
nature, which is in line with earlier research showing that the visual
modality is often dominant in mental imagery [e.g., Ref. (24)]. Of
all reported involuntary cognitions, only 61.29% were (autobio-
graphical) memories, as indicated by the participants. This left us
with 38.71% of “non-memories,” which were further categorized
using available coding schemes and relevant descriptive literature
(see Materials and Methods). The non-memories mainly consisted
of daydreams, imagery of worst case scenarios, future events, hypo-
thetical reconstructions of past events that were not solved for the
individual (i.e., “missing pieces” in a coherent narrative), and ver-
bal ruminations. These types of cognitions occurred more or less
in equal numbers.
In terms of content, the three main categories that were
observed were social relations (e.g., an image of a friend sit-
ting across from you in the train), life-threatening events (e.g.,
a bloody accident), and recreation/exploration (e.g., relaxing on
top of a hill with a great view). Possible or hypothetical functions
were identified based on available literature (see Materials and
Methods). Our examination led us to conclude that around 33%
of the involuntary cognitions reported could be functional for
emotional processing, 25% for maintaining social relationships,
20% as warning signals, 10% in mood repair, and another 10%
in preparing for future events. Analyses that compared memories
and non-memories revealed surprisingly few differences. Mem-
ories and non-memories were comparable in terms of valence,
emotions, and emotional intensity. This may suggest that for the
individual, the distinction between memories and non-memories
may not in fact be important, as both types of involuntary cogni-
tions represent fairly similar experiences, at least in terms of the
characteristics that were measured in this study. Further, for the
life-threatening events category, intrusive cognitions were twice
as likely to be memories as opposed to non-memories, and there
were no non-memories of the recreation/exploration categories.
These findings may be methodological artifacts, because the inher-
ent nature of the categories “life-threatening events” and “explo-
ration/recreation” have a strong associations with personal past
experiences.
For both memories and non-memories, the most prevalent
potential function was emotional processing. Mood repair was
more often associated with memories than non-memories, in line
with previous evidence of the effectiveness of positive memory
recall as a means by which to counter a sad mood state [e.g., Ref.
(33)]. Prevalent potential functions for non-memories were warn-
ing signals and preparation for future events. For the potential
function of preparation this is not surprising, as the cognition is
about an event that has not happened yet and could therefore not
be a memory [although it is likely that the information represented
in the future oriented cognition heavily draws on information
from past experiences; (41)]. This potential function of a“warning
signal” was identified from the literature on psychological trauma,
in which it has been proposed that involuntary autobiographical
memories of negative events may occur in situations in which cues
are present that could signal or predict a repeat of the past expe-
rience (22). In our study, we identified memories that could be
interpreted as serving the function of a warning signal. For exam-
ple, one participant had experienced her foot getting stuck in the
wheel when cycling, which resulted in a bloody toe. She experi-
enced an involuntary memory of this toe whenever the risk of a
repeat of this accident was present (e.g., walking close behind a
grocery trolley). The finding in our sample that it was not only
memories served that function of a warning signal may suggest
that non-memories may function as warning signals for negative
experiences even if the individual has not experienced a similar
experience him/herself before.
In addition to involuntary cognitions, self-descriptions and
psychopathology were assessed using the Twenty-Statement Test
(37), and the SCL-90 (38), respectively. Correlational analyses
showed that whereas positive self-descriptions (e.g.,“I am smart”)
were negatively associated with psychopathology, they were not
related to any characteristics of the involuntary cognitions. Neg-
ative self-descriptions (e.g., “I am ugly”), in contrast, were not
only associated with levels of psychopathology, but also with the
number of negative, mostly sadness-related involuntary cogni-
tions, levels of sadness associated with the cognitions, the num-
ber of guilt/shame cognitions, and the hypothetical function of
emotional processing. This latter relationship may indicate that
emotional processing of one or more negative experiences could
be a main goal for individuals with a negative self-image. This
would be in line with the theoretical proposition that mental
images are associated with an individual’s goals, which in turn
are related to their self-image, according to the Self-Memory
System (42). Higher scores on the SCL-90, indicating higher lev-
els of psychopathology, were related to more distressing invol-
untary cognitions, and specifically higher numbers of disgust-
related involuntary cognitions, greater levels of disgust, more
involuntary cognitions involving bodily sensations, and more non-
memories classified as worst case scenarios. Further, the SCL-90
subscales revealed many significant correlations with character-
istics of involuntary cognitions and self-descriptions, supportive
of a theoretical link between psychopathology, involuntary cog-
nitions, and the self (21). Some general observations were that
most correlations were positive (except for the correlation with
intensity of happiness associated with happy involuntary cogni-
tions), suggesting that the experience of involuntary cognitions is
mostly associated with poorer mental health, and not with posi-
tive mental well-being. Further, some variables showed significant
relations across multiple subscales of the SCL-90, such as intrusive
bodily sensations, involuntary cognitions associated with distress
or disgust, and the intensity of the associated distress or disgust,
lower numbers of positive self-descriptions and higher number
of negative self-descriptions. Although it is tempting to engage
in theoretical interpretation of these correlations as some appear
very intuitive (e.g., a correlation between involuntary cognitions
about life-threatening events and the subscales Obsessive com-
pulsive and Anxiety; and the function of warning signal and the
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Anxiety subscale) we should be extremely careful with any such
interpretations as our findings await replication.
Because an unselected sample was recruited, it is possible and
even likely that some participants suffered from psychological
symptoms (whether subclinical, or consistent with a clinical diag-
nosis – e.g., obsessive compulsive disorder, panic disorder) at the
time of testing, which may in part explain these findings. Fur-
ther, the majority of participants in our sample were female and
therefore the results may be more representative of females than
males. Future research with samples of individuals who have been
screened for the presence of psychopathological conditions will
test this possibility.
This study has several limitations. First, the advantages of using
a bottom-up approach also come with methodological disadvan-
tages. The coding schemes that were used were based on existing
literature where possible, but were not available or suitable for
all our study goals. Therefore, we constructed several classifica-
tions on face value (e.g., “hypothetical reconstructions”). Overall
inter-rater reliabilities for existing classifications varied from min-
imal (e.g., for quality coding) to moderate (e.g., type) to high
(e.g., for content and self-descriptions). Therefore, the findings
presented here are very preliminary and replication will be impor-
tant. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, this approach allowed
us to explore the phenomenon of involuntary cognitions in a way
which resulted, in our opinion, in an intriguing pattern of findings.
Further, the literature that was reviewed in the Section “Intro-
duction” included different types of involuntary cognitions that
have been identified in the cognitive and clinical literature. That
is, involuntary autobiographical memories, involuntary seman-
tic cognitions, and involuntary thoughts and images all come to
mind unbidden, and in the case of cognitions of negative content
or valence, are unwanted. However, our data showed that other
mental phenomena, such as rumination and forms of mind wan-
dering (e.g., daydreams) were sometimes similarly experienced as
involuntary and spontaneous by our participants, even though in
the literature rumination and daydreaming are typically not cate-
gorized as “intrusive” or “involuntary” cognitions (although their
onset may be spontaneous). Thus, it may be warranted to broaden
our view of the types of cognitions that can potentially be expe-
rienced as involuntary to include rumination and forms of mind
wandering. Second, the structured interview assessed only three
“main” involuntary cognitions that occurred during the month
preceding the study. This is likely to be a gross underestimation
of the number of involuntary cognitions that occur daily [c.f.,
(13, 17)], and frequency of occurrence of involuntary cognitions
was not assessed which, although not the goal of this study, may
be considered a limitation as cognitions with a high frequency of
occurrence may also differ from low frequency cognitions. In addi-
tion, we did not assess triggers, which could have provided further
information about the content and function of the involuntary
cognitions.
Relatedly, the involuntary cognitions that were reported all had
some emotional impact (with means ranging from M = 4.83 to
M = 6.33 on a scale from 1 to 7), which is likely at least partly
due to a retrospective bias, such that more significant or emo-
tional cognitions will be remembered whereas less significant or
emotional cognitions, which are perhaps also more frequent, may
be forgotten. Nevertheless, emotional cognitions may be more
informative for some purposes as these are more likely to translate
to behavior [e.g., actually preparing for a future event, avoid-
ing a negative consequence, etc., (34)]. Third, all cognitions that
were reported were classified on all factors of interest (quality,
type, content, and function), resulting in overlapping categories.
For example, a cognition with a function of maintaining social
relations most likely overlaps with cognitions with a content of
social relations, and cognitions for mood repair and cognitions
about recreation/exploration likely overlap because of their pos-
itive valence. In light of this, the findings therefore need to be
interpreted with caution. Finally, although the findings of this
study show that there are many different types of involuntary
cognitions, each with its own specific quality and characteristics
and potential function, the nature of this study prevents us from
drawing firm conclusions about the relations between these char-
acteristics. Prospective and experimental studies are needed to test
their empirical significance.
To summarize, we present several interesting findings that
provide food for thought for both clinical and cognitive psychol-
ogists who are interested in involuntary cognitions. The main
goal of this study was to explore the quality, type, content, and
function of involuntary cognitions in everyday life, without lim-
iting focus to a specific subtype (e.g., autobiographical memories,
positive or negative cognitions). One of the main findings was
that involuntary memories differ very little from other invol-
untary cognitions on important markers such as valence and
emotionality. This raises the question as to whether the dis-
tinction between memories and non-memories is actually an
important one in the experience of the individual. Interest-
ingly, specific relationships emerged between psychopathology
and negative self-descriptions, as well as the characteristics of
cognitions. In our view, these are exciting preliminary findings
that we hope may spark future research into involuntary cogni-
tions and their specific impact on the individual’s experience and
behavior.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank all participants for completing this study.
Julie Krans was supported by a Rubicon Fellowship of the Nether-
lands Organisation for Scientific Research during part of this
project.
REFERENCES
1. Moulds ML, Holmes EA. Intrusive imagery in psychopathology: a commentary.
Int J Cogn Ther (2011) 4:197–207. doi:10.1521/ijct.2011.4.2.197
2. Day S, Holmes EA, Hackmann A. Occurrence of imagery and its link with
early memories in agoraphobia. Memory (2004) 12:416–27. doi:10.1080/
09658210444000034
3. Hirsch CR, Clark DM, Mathews A, Williams R. Self-images play a causal role in
social phobia. Behav Res Ther (2003) 41:909–21. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(02)
00103-1
4. Hales SA, Deeprose C, Goodwin GM, Holmes EA. Cognitions in bipolar disorder
and unipolar depression: imagining suicide. Bipolar Disord (2011) 13:651–61.
doi:10.1111/j.1399-5618.2011.00954.x
5. Boelen PA, Huntjens RJC. Intrusive images in grief: an exploratory study. Clin
Psychol Psychother (2008) 15:217–26. doi:10.1002/cpp.568
6. Newby JM, Moulds ML. Characteristics of intrusive memories in a commu-
nity sample of depressed, recovered depressed, and never-depressed individuals.
Behav Res Ther (2011) 49:234–43. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2011.01.003
Frontiers in Psychiatry | Affective Disorders and Psychosomatic Research February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 7 | 10
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Krans et al. Involuntary cognitions in everyday life
7. Brewin CR, Christodoulides J, Hutchinson G. Intrusive thoughts and intrusive
memories in a nonclinical sample. Cogn Emot (1996) 10:107–12. doi:10.1080/
026999396380411
8. Berntsen D. Involuntary autobiographical memories. Appl Cogn Psychol (1996)
10:435–54. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199610)10:5<435::AID-ACP408>3.
0.CO;2-L
9. Berntsen D. Involuntary memories of emotional events: do memories of trau-
mas and extremely happy events differ? Appl Cogn Psychol (2001) 15:135–58.
doi:10.1002/acp.838
10. Berntsen D, Rubin DC. Emotionally charged autobiographical memories across
the life span: the recall of happy, sad, traumatic, and involuntary memories.
Psychol Aging (2002) 17:636–52. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.17.4.636
11. Berntsen D, Hall NM. The episodic nature of involuntary autobiographical
memories. Mem Cognit (2004) 32:789–803. doi:10.3758/BF03195869
12. Schlagman S, Kvavilashvili L. Involuntary autobiographical memories in and
outside the laboratory: how different are they from voluntary autobiographical
memories? Mem Cognit (2008) 36:920–32. doi:10.3758/MC.36.5.920
13. Kvavilashvili L, Mandler G. Out of one’s mind: a study of involuntary semantic
memories. Cogn Psychol (2004) 48:47–94. doi:10.1016/S0010-0285(03)00115-4
14. Rachman S, De Silva P. Abnormal and normal obsessions. Behav Res Ther (1978)
16:233–8. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(78)90022-0
15. Salkovskis PM, Harrison J. Abnormal and normal obsessions: a replication.
Behav Res Ther (1984) 22:549–52. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(84)90057-3
16. Clark DM, De Silva P. The nature of depressive and anxious intrusive thoughts:
distinct or uniform phenomena? Behav Res Ther (1985) 23:383–93. doi:10.1016/
0005-7967(85)90166-4
17. Killingsworth MA, Gilbert DT. A wandering mind is an unhappy mind. Science
(2010) 330:932. doi:10.1126/science.1192439
18. Smallwood J, Ruby FJM, Singer T. Letting go of the present: mind-wandering
is associated with reduced delay discounting. Conscious Cogn (2013) 22:1–7.
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.10.007
19. Holmes EA, Crane C, Fennell MJV, Williams MG. Imagery about suicide in
depression – “flash-forwards”? J Behav Ther Exp Psychiatry (2007) 38:423–34.
doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2007.10.004
20. Clark DM. Intrusive Thoughts in Clinical Disorders. Theory, Research, and Treat-
ment. New York, NY: Guildford Press (2004).
21. Conway MA, Pleydell-Pearce CW. The construction of autobiographical mem-
ories in the self-memory system. Psychol Rev (2000) 107:261–88. doi:10.1037/
0033-295X.107.2.261
22. Ehlers A, Hackmann A, Steil R, Clohessy S, Wenninger K, Winter H. The nature
of intrusive memories after trauma: the warning signal hypothesis. Behav Res
Ther (2002) 40:995–1002. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(01)00077-8
23. Hackmann A, Ehlers A, Speckens A, Clark DM. Characteristics and content of
intrusive memories in PTSD and their changes with treatment. J Trauma Stress
(2004) 17:231–40. doi:10.1023/B:JOTS.0000029266.88369.fd
24. Speckens AEM, Ehlers A, Hackmann A, Ruths FA, Clark DM. Intrusive
memories and rumination in patients with post-traumatic stress disorder:
a phenomenological comparison. Memory (2007) 15:249–57. doi:10.1080/
09658210701256449
25. Blagov PS, Singer JA. Four dimensions of self-defining memories (specificity,
meaning, content, and affect) and their relationships to self-restraint, distress,
and repressive defensiveness. J Pers (2004) 72:481–512. doi:10.1111/j.0022-3506.
2004.00270.x
26. Thorne A, McLean KC. Manual for Coding Events in Self-Defining Memories.
Santa Cruz: University of California (2001).
27. Bluck S, Alea N, Habermas T, Rubin DC. A tale of three functions: the
self-reported uses of autobiographical memory. Soc Cogn (2005) 23:91–117.
doi:10.1080/09658211.2014.930153
28. Krans J, Näring G, Becker ES, Holmes EA. Intrusive trauma memory: a review
and functional analysis. Appl Cogn Psychol (2009) 23(8):1076–88. doi:10.1002/
acp.1611
29. Brewin CR, Dalgleish T, Joseph S. A dual representation theory of post traumatic
stress disorder. Psychol Rev (1996) 103:670–86. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.103.4.
670
30. Alea N, Bluck S. Why are you telling me that? A conceptual model of
the social function of autobiographical memory. Memory (2003) 11:165–78.
doi:10.1080/741938207
31. Parrot WG, Sabini J. Mood and memory under natural conditions: evi-
dence for mood incongruent recall. J Pers Soc Psychol (1990) 59:321–36.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.59.2.321
32. Rusting CL, DeHart T. Retrieving positive memories to regulate negative
mood: consequences for mood-congruent memory. J Pers Soc Psychol (2000)
78:737–52. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.78.4.737
33. Joormann J, Siemer M. Memory accessibility, mood regulation, and dyspho-
ria: difficulties in repairing sad mood with happy memories? J Abnorm Psychol
(2004) 113:179–88. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.113.2.179
34. Holmes EA, Mathews A. Mental imagery and emotion: a special relationship?
Emotion (2005) 5:489–97. doi:10.1037/1528-3542.5.4.489
35. Libby LK, Shaeffer EM, Eibach RP, Slemmer JA. Picture yourself at the polls:
visual perspective in mental imagery affects self-perception and behaviour. Psy-
chol Sci (2007) 18:199–203. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01872.x
36. Kuhn MH, McPartland TS. An empirical investigation into self attitudes. Am
Sociol Rev (1954) 19:68–76. doi:10.2307/2088175
37. Horton CL, Moulin CJA, Conway MA. The self and dreams during a
period of transition. Conscious Cogn (2009) 18:710–7. doi:10.1016/j.concog.
2009.07.001
38. Ettema JHM, Arrindell WA. SCL-90: Herziene handleiding bij een multidimen-
sionele psychopathologie indicator. Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger (2003).
39. Kloens GJ, Barelds DPH, Luteijn F, Schaap CPDR. De waarde van enige vragen-
lijsten in de eerstelijn. Diagnostiek-wijzer (2002) 5:130–48.
40. Millisecond Software. Inquisit 2.0 [Computer Software]. Seattle, WA: Millisecond
Software (2006).
41. Schacter DL, Addis DR, Buckner RL. Remembering the past to imagine the
future: the prospective brain. Nat Rev Neurosci (2007) 8:657–61. doi:10.1038/
nrn2213
42. Conway MA, Meares K, Standart S. Images and goals. Memory (2004) 12:525–31.
doi:10.1080/09658210444000151
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was conducted
in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 28 October 2014; accepted: 15 January 2015; published online: 02 February
2015.
Citation: Krans J, de Bree J and Moulds ML (2015) Involuntary cognitions in every-
day life: exploration of type, quality, content, and function. Front. Psychiatry 6:7. doi:
10.3389/fpsyt.2015.00007
This article was submitted to Affective Disorders and Psychosomatic Research, a section
of the journal Frontiers in Psychiatry.
Copyright © 2015 Krans, de Bree and Moulds. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s)
or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in
accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 7 | 11
